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SECURITIES ARBITRATION: BETTER FOR
INVESTORS THAN THE COURTS?*
Marc I. Steinbergt
I. To HOWARD BARTNICK
This Article is dedicated to my good friend Howard
Bartnick who died suddenly a year ago. Howard had a success-
ful career-in the Division of Market Regulation and General
Counsel's Office at the SEC and in the financial services indus-
try at Bank of America, Prudential and PaineWebber. More
important, Howard was a devoted husband and father to his
delightful wife Libby and two wonderful children. He also was
one of the best friends Ive ever had. I trusted him implicitly
and we had many great times together. Why he who was so
genuine and well liked would be taken from us in his early
forties is hard to understand. Although we did not visit as
frequently in the last few years, due to distance and seemingly
more pressing matters, our good friendship remained intact. I
miss Howard, and hope that this Article dealing with a subject
that he knew meets with his approval and smile.
II. SECURITIES ARBITRATION--SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Nearly a decade has passed since the U.S. Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon,' upholding the validity of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements under the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act
or 1934 Act) between brokerage firms and their customers.'
©1997 Marc I. Steinberg. All Rights Reserved.
Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, School of Law, Southern
Methodist University. Of Counsel, Winstead Sechrest & Minick, P.C.
This Article was funded by a Summer Research Grant from the SMU School
of Law. I thank the SMU Law School and Dean C. Paul Rogers. My thanks to
Professors Alan Bromberg, George Martinez and Norman Poser for their helpful
comments.
482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994). The Court in McMahon also upheld the validity of
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Shortly thereafter, the high court in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,' gave its approbation to the
validity of such agreements under the Securities Act (Securi-
ties Act or 1933 Act).4
These decisions generated hurrahs from the brokerage
industry' and anguish from public investors (and, of course,
their legal counsel).6 Arbitration between brokerage firms and
their public customers, epitomized by the unsophisticated indi-
vidual investor, was seen by many as stacked in the industry's
favor.7 Indeed, this perception prevails today as evidenced by
a relatively recent front-page Wall Street Journal article high-
lighting the pitfalls of arbitration for investors.8
This perception was (and continues to be) based on the
apparent unfairness of the customer-broker arbitration process.
Many brokerage firms compel their clients, even in cash ac-
counts, to execute arbitration agreements as a condition to
doing business? The presence of industry representatives who
such predispute arbitration provisions with respect to claims brought under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). For further discus-
sion, see infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
3 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
4 15 U.S.C. § 77a. For further discussion, see infra notes 39-40 and accom-
panying text. See generally MARILYN CANE & PATRICIA SHUB, SECURITIES ARBITRA-
TION: LAW AND PROCEDURE (1991); C. EDWARD FLETCHER, ARBITRATING SECURITIES
DISPUTES (1990); RALPH S. JANVEY, REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES AND COMMODI-
TIES MARKETS H 8.01-8.04 (1992).
See, e.g., Stephen Bedell & Brian Bosch, The Rodriguez Decision: A New
Tradition in the Arbitration of Securities Disputes, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 53 (1990).
' See, e.g., Robert Gregory, Arbitration: It's Mandatory But It Ain't Fair, 19
SEC. REG. L.J. 181 (1991); see also Lee Applebaum, Predispute Arbitration Agree-
ments Between Brokers and Investors: The Extension of Wilko to Section 10(b)
Claims, 46 MD. L. REV. 339 (1987); Neal M. Brown et al., Arbitration of Customer-
Broker Disputes Under the Federal Securities Laws and RICO, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 3
(1987).
' See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 6, at 184 (asserting that "arbitration as cur-
rently conducted by the NASD, NYSE or . . . AMEX is not fair"); see also author-
ities cited infra notes 42-47.
' See Margaret Jacobs & Michael Siconolfi, Investors Fare Poorly Fighting Wall
Street--and May Do Worse, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at Al (stating that "arbi-
tration has earned a reputation for being stacked squarely against brokerage-firm
customers").
' See Linda D. Fienberg & Matthew S. Yeo, The NASD Securities Arbitration
Report: A View from the Inside, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1996, at 7, 8 (stating that "Islince
McMahon, broker-dealers have required almost all individual investors who open
margin or option accounts to sign a predispute arbitration agreement, and most
broker-dealers require it for all customer accounts"); see also Anne Brafford, Coin-
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may favor brokerage firms (as well as industry employees),"
the inconsistency in the quality of arbitrators,' the lack of a
written decision justifying the award,' the near impossibility
of persuading a court to overturn an arbitration decision under
the "manifest disregard" standard,' and the lack of investor
success when pursuing seemingly meritorious claims' all con-
tribute to the belief that public investors receive callous treat-
ment in this process.'
Nonetheless, mounting evidence shows that many inves-
tors emerge victorious from arbitration, even recovering puni-
tive damages in appropriate cases." The lack of intensive pre-
ment, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or Trap
for the Weak and Unwary, 21 J. CORP. L. 331 (1996).
" See Gregory, supra note 6, at 184-85. A mqjority of the arbitration panel
must be comprised of public arbitrators. Generally, an industry arbitrator is an
individual who:
1. Is currently associated with a broker dealer, municipal securities deal-
er or has been associated with one in the last three years;
2. Is retired... ;
3. Has a spouse or other household member associated with a securities
entity, or
4. Is a professional outside of the securities industry who has devoted
20% or more of his or her individual work effort to securities industry
clients within the industry during the previous two years.
SECURIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION ("SICAw), UNORM CODE OF
ARBITRATION § 8(a)(2) (1994) [hereinafter UCAI; see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECuRrnEs DEALERS, INC. (uNASD*), CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 19(c)-
(d) (1996) [hereinafter NASD ARBrrRATON CODE].
" See Report of the Arbitration Policy Task Force to the Board of Governors,
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 85,735, at 87,475 (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter Ruder Report]
(stating that "it is essential for the NASD to improve the overall quality, training,
and effectiveness of NASD arbitrators").
' See NASD ARBITRATION CODE, supra note 10, at Rule 41; accord, New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") Rule 627; American Stock Exchange (*AMEX") Rule 618.
For further discussion, see infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
' See CANE & SHUB, supra note 4, at 336-38; FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 392.14 See Jacobs & Siconolfi, supra note 8, at Al.
15 See authorities cited supra notes 7-8. But see Norman Poser, When ADR
Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 1095, 1111 (1993) (stating that "it would not be fair to describe [arbitration)
as a deck stacked in favor of the brokerage firms7).
" See, eg., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. CL 1212
(1995) (holding that an arbitration clause containing a New York choice of law
provision was not designed to incorporate that state's prohibition of punitive dam-
ages in arbitrations); Poser, supra note 15, at 1097 (stating that larbitration
panels have frequently given investors very substantial awards, sometimes includ-
ing punitive damages"); Margo Reder, Punitive Damages Are a Necessary Remedy
19961 1505
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trial discovery-at least as compared to the court set-
ting'7-and the more expeditious time frame in which arbitra-
tion proceeds may favor the public investor who cannot match
the brokerage firm's litigation resources.18 Moreover, the inap-
plicability of strict pleading rules, along with the informality of
arbitration, may result in the arbitrators seeking to be "fair"
whereas such claims may have been dismissed by a court.19
These reflections are particularly poignant in view of rela-
tively recent federal court decisions, including in the Second
Circuit,0 that significantly restrict the viability of investors'
in Broker-Customer Securities Arbitration Cases, 29 IND. L. REV. 105, 130 (1995)
(stating that "[p]unitive damages must be available as a remedy in securities arbi-
tration [and that they] must never be considered waived absent clear evidence of
an affirmative intent to do so"); Quinton F. Seamons, Punitive Damages in Securi-
ties Arbitration: Jokers, Deuces, and One-Eyed Jacks Are Wild!, 21 SEC. REG. L.J.
387 (1994) (stating that in securities arbitration "[plunitive damages during 1992
were significant, ranging from $250,000 to $3.5 million"); Milo Geyelin, Smith
Barney, Broker Ordered to Pay $1 Million in Mostly Punitive Damages, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 16, 1996, at B2 (levying of $750,000 in punitive damages); Michael
Siconolfi, Stock Investors Win More Punitive Awards in Arbitration Cases, WALL
ST. J., June 11, 1990, at Al (stating that "the clearest sign of trouble for Wall
Street is a surge in punitive-damage awards").
17 Historically, securities arbitration was "a model of informal, expeditious, and
inexpensive dispute resolution." Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 87,433. Today,
"[tihe increasingly litigious nature of securities arbitration has gradually eroded
[its] advantages [and there now is] concern that SRO arbitration has incorporated
too many characteristics of civil litigation . .. ." Ruder Report, supra note 11, at
87,433. Nonetheless, the Task Force "believe[s] it is essential that securities arbi-
tration continues to provide clear and significant advantages over the civil litiga-
tion system it has replaced." Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 87,433.
18 See Deborah Masucci, Securities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the
Future Hold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 183, 188-89 (1996) (stating that during
1994, the average length of time a case took was 10.4 months, with the average
hearing lasting 2.5 days, thereby prompting the author to assert "[tihese are re-
markable figures when compared to the time for resolution in crowded court dock-
ets nationwide").
" See infra notes 70-150 and accompanying text; see also Shelly James, Arbi-
tration in the Securities Field: Does the Present System of Arbitration Between
Small Investors and Brokerage Firms Really Protect Anyone?, 21 J. CORP. L. 363,
369 (1996) (stating that qualitative analysis therein denies the existence of bias in
arbitration).
20 See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 189 (5th Cir. 1996)
(dismissing investor's case against brokerage firm and registered representative for
failing to allege fraud with adequate particularity); Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12
F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 1993) (dismissing investor's case pursuant to 1934 Act § 10(b)
statute of limitations); Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding plaintiff did not satisfy justifiable reliance requirement under
§ 10(b)); Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1990) (dismissal of
[Vol. 62: 15031506
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claims.2 Enactment of The Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 ("PSLRA!)' also spells "gloom" for uniniti-
ated investors.' These developments portend that the avail-
ability of a federal court forum may be particularly unattrac-
tive to brokerage firm customers today. Hence, investors now
may well be in a better position bringing their claims in arbi-
tration rather than in federal court.24
Depending on the particular state, however, public inves-
tors compelled to arbitrate are in a worse position after
McMahon. In states such as California and Texas, whose stat-
utes provide for broad relief,' investors lose a favorable judi-
cial forum to bring their grievances. On the other hand, in a
state such as New York which declines to provide a private
remedy for violation of its securities laws,' investors may
well be content to proceed in arbitration.'
This Article will expand on the concepts set forth above.
After discussing McMahon, Rodriguez and their aftermath, the
Article examines the arbitration process today. Thereafter,
both the federal and state court forums will be analyzed from
the perspective of the prospective investor-litigant. The Article
concludes by addressing whether investors in the brokerage
firm setting are in a better or worse position by being relegat-
ed to arbitration rather than the courts.
investor's case pursuant to interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in
context of § 10(b) pleading requirements).
21 See Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Deci-
sions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489
(1995) [hereinafter Ramdfications].
' See Senate Overrides President's Veto; Securities Litigation Reform Bill Now
Law, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 3 (1996); see generally Stephen F. Black et al.,
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Preliminary Analysis, 24
SEC. REG. L.J. 115 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975
(1996).
See Marc I. Steinberg, Litigation Reform Act Will Have Major Impact, 24
SEC. REG. L.J. 115 (1996).
24 See infra notes 71-150 and accompanying text.
' See Steinberg, Ramifications, supra note 21, at 509-16; discussion infra notes
156-162 and accompanying text.
2 See CPC Int'l v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 514 N.E.2d 116, 519
N.Y.S.2d 804 (1987).
2 See infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
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III. A LOOK AT MCMAHON AND RODRIGUEZ
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,8 the
Supreme Court held that predispute arbitration agreements
between brokerage firms and their customers did not contra-
vene the Exchange Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). Hence, such claims ordinarily
are arbitrable consistent with the terms of the applicable arbi-
tration agreement. The following discussion focuses on the
validity of such predispute arbitration agreements under the
securities laws.
In McMahon, the Supreme Court relied in large part on
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")29 which establishes a
"federal policy favoring arbitration."" This policy applies even
when a claim is based on a federal statutory right. As a conse-
quence, the burden is on the party opposing the validity of the
arbitration agreement to show that Congress intended to pre-
serve the availability of a judicial forum, irrespective of the
terms of an arbitration agreement. 1 Hence, to preclude appli-
cation of the FAA, according to the Court, the party seeking to
avoid arbitration "must demonstrate that Congress intended to
make an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims arising un-
der... the Exchange Act, an intention discernible from the
text, history, or purposes of the statute."32
Upon examining section 29(a) of the Exchange Act, which
renders void any stipulation whereby a person waives compli-
ance with any 1934 Act provision, the Court opined that sec-
tion 29(a) only proscribes waiver of the Exchange Act's sub-
stantive obligations. By contrast, section 29(a) does not pre-
clude parties from waiving a judicial forum in favor of an arbi-
tral tribunal.33
2 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987). The discussion herein,
notes 28-47 and accompanying text, derives from my student reference text. MARC
STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 12.02 (2d ed. 1996).
2 MeMahon, 482 U.S. at 242; see 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
30 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
3 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (relying on Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 228-38.
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The Court's holding in McMahon takes a far different view
of arbitration than its 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan.' In
holding that predispute arbitration agreements were not en-
forceable in actions brought pursuant to section 12(2) (now
section 12(a)(2)) of the Securities Act, the Wilko Court invoked
the antiwaiver provision of the Securities Act, section 14,
which is section 29(a)'s counterpart. Underlying the Wilko
Court's holding was its hostility to the arbitration process.
Succinctly put, the Court believed that arbitration would fail to
protect an investor's substantive rights. As a consequence, a
judicial forum was necessary to ensure that the statutory
rights created by section 12(2) would be adequately protect-
ed.'
Although declining to overrule Wilko at that time,25 the
Supreme Court in McMahon asserted that, in view of the in-
creased regulatory oversight of arbitration since Wilko was
handed down, a party's 1934 Act substantive rights are not
waived by enforcing a predispute arbitration agreement. Pur-
suant to the 1975 amendments to the 1934 Act, the SEC now
"has broad authority to oversee and to regulate the rules
adopted by the [self-regulatory organizations] relating to cus-
tomer disputes, including the power to mandate the adoption
of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitration
procedures adequately protect statutory rights."3 Accordingly,
the McMahon Court held:
We conclude, therefore, that Congress did not intend for § 29(a) to
bar enforcement of all predispute arbitration agreements. In this
case, where the SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure
that arbitration is adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights, en-
forcement does not effect a waiver of "compliance with any provi-
sion" of the Exchange Act under § 29(a).'
34 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Id. at 432-37.
"McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234 ("[Slkare decisis concerns may counsel against
upsetting Wilko's contrary compulsion under the Securities Ac...
3 Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 238 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974)).
But see id. at 252-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1996] 1509
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Subsequently, in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc.,39 the Supreme Court overruled Wilko. Hold-
ing that predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the
Securities Act are enforceable, the Court stated:
[I]n McMahon the Court declined to read § 29(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the language of which is in every respect the
same as that in § 14 of the 1933 Act, to prohibit enforcement of
predispute agreements to arbitrate. The only conceivable distinction
in this regard between the Securities Act and the Securities Ex-
change Act is that the former statute allows concurrent federal-state
jurisdiction over causes of action and the latter statute provides for
exclusive federal jurisdiction. But even if this distinction were
thought to make any difference at all, it would suggest that arbitra-
tion agreements, which are "in effect, a specialized kind of forum-
selection clause,". . . should not be prohibited under the Securities
Act, since they, like the provision for concurrent jurisdiction, serve
to advance the objective of allowing buyers of securities a broader
right to select the forum for resolving disputes, whether it be judi-
cial or otherwise."
9 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
'0 Id. at 482-83 (citation omitted). Also, the Court in Rodriguez relied on the
'strong language of the Arbitration Act" under which "the party opposing arbitra-
tion carries the burden of showing that Congress intended in a separate statute to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies, or that such a waiver of judicial remedies
inherently conflicts with the underlying purposes of that other statute." Id. at 483.
Recently, the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases in the securities
arbitration area. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct.
1920 (1995) (holding that (i) the issue of whether parties agreed to arbitrate a
certain matter is a question for the court to decide, and (ii) the standard that a
court of appeals should apply when reviewing a district court decision confirming
an arbitration award "should proceed like review of any other district court deci-
sion . . . , i.e., accepting findings of fact that are not 'clearly erroneous' but decid-
ing questions of law de novo"); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 1212 (1995) (holding that award of punitive damages in arbitration proceed-
ing not precluded by terms of broker firm-client agreement where agreement did
not expressly refer to punitive damages and was ambiguous in this regard, result-
ing in such ambiguity being construed against the drafter of the agreement, the
brokerage firm); authorities cited supra note 16; see also Nielsen v. Piper, Jaffray
& Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying NASD rule placing class
actions outside the purview of otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements).
[Vol. 62: 16031510
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IV. AFTERMATH OF MCMAHON AND RODRIGUEZ
In the aftermath of McMahon and Rodriguez, many be-
lieved that securities arbitration favored the industry.4 As
stated in a 1987 New York Times article, "the [brokerage]
houses basically like the current system because they own the
stacked deck."42 A 1992 U.S. General Accounting Office
("GAO") Report on Securities Arbitration, however, concluded
that its "statistical analysis of case results ... showed no evi-
dence of pro-industry bias at industry-sponsored forums.'a
Nonetheless, as Professor Perry Wallace points out, "[gliven
the prominence that securities arbitration is likely to enjoy in
the future, probing questions must be asked now regarding the
effectiveness [and] basic fairness... of the procedures that
effectuate it."
Even though not finding a pro-industry bias, the GAO
report nonetheless was critical of the current process, stating
that its "review of arbitration procedures showed that arbitra-
tion forums lacked internal controls to provide a reasonable
level of assurance regarding either the independence of the
arbitrators or their competence in arbitrating disputes."5
Needless to say, such lack of internal controls, as found by the
GAO, brings into question the integrity of the arbitration pro-
cess.
Fortunately, certain improvements have been made since
1987. For example, in cases involving public customers, an
arbitration panel consists of a majority of public arbitrators.
The new rules more rigorously define those who qualify as
public arbitrators.4" The rules also call for preservation of a
' See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 6, at 184-86.
William Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. TI?,tES, Mar. 29,
1987, at 1, 8. A 1995 Wall Street Journal article reached a similar conclusion. See
Jacobs & Siconolfi, supra note 8, at Al.
"UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: HOW
INVESToRS FARE 60 (GAO/GGD-92-74) (May 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. But
see Joel Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the Hard
Questions, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 327, 367 (1996) (stating that GAO "data may now be
stale and in any event cry out for amplification").
"Perry E. Wallace, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez, and the
New Rules: Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAUD. L. REV. 1199,
1202 (1990).
, GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 6.
See supra note 10; see also Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 87,468-87,479.
1996]
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record of the proceeding and for disclosure to the parties of cer-
tain past or existing affiliations of the arbitrators that are
likely to affect their impartiality. Moreover, the statement of
award must contain the arbitrators' and parties' names, a
summary of the relevant issues in controversy, the damages
and/or other relief sought and awarded, a statement of any
other issues resolved, and the signatures of the arbitrators who
concurred in the award.47
V. ARBITRATION TODAY
Arbitration today, although more complex than in yester-
year," remains a relatively informal process. Rather than
burdensome pleading requirements as frequently mandated by
federal law,49 a complainant in arbitration "need only specify
"T See Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, 1989 SEC LEXIS 843 (May 10, 1989);
see generally C. Edward Fletcher III, Learning to Live with the Federal Arbitration
Act-Securities Litigation in a Post-McMahon World, 37 EmORY L.J. 99 (1988);
Mahlon M. Frankhauser & Linda M. Gardner, An Up-to-Date Review of Judicial,
Legislative, and Regulatory Developments in Arbitration with Financial Institutions,
46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 583 (1989); William A. Gregory & William J. Schneider,
Securities Arbitration: A Need for Continued Reform, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1223 (1993);
Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHADI URB.
L.J. 361 (1987-88); Poser, supra note 15; G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Cor-
porate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517 (1989); Wallace, supra note 44.
" See Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 87,463-87,468; supra note 17.
" See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requirement of pleading fraud with particular-
ity). Moreover, pursuant to the PSLRA, new § 21D(b) of the Exchange Act sets
forth:
(1) A requirement that a plaintiff in the complaint in any private securi-
ties fraud action alleging material misstatements and/or omissions "speci-
fy each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."
(2) A requirement that in any private action under the 1934 Act in
which the plaintiff "may recover money damages only on proof that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with
respect to each such act or omission alleged to violate [the 1934 Act),
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind."
See PSLRA of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 782, amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on Conference, observ-
ing that the language contained in § 21D(b) derives "in part" from the Second
Circuit's pleading requirement which is "regarded as the most stringent pleading
standard," but also stating that "the Conference Committee intends to strengthen
existing pleading requirements"); infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62:16031512
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the relevant facts and the remedies sought.' Although dis-
covery is permitted to an increasing extent, 1 including writ-
ten requests for informations2 and document requests," a
number of the more costly and time consuming aspects of dis-
covery found in federal and state court litigation usually are
not present.s4 Hence, depositions are rarely permittedF and
so UCA, supra note 10, § 13. This provision is included in the NASD, NYSE
and AMEX arbitration rules. See NASD ARBRATION CODE, supra note 10, Rule
25(a); NYSE Rule 612(a), supra note 12; AMEX Rule 606(a), supra note 12. More-
over, the American Arbitration Association's ("AAA") Securities Arbitration Rules
similarly require that the demand for arbitration "shall contain a statement set-
ting forth the nature of the dispute, the amount involved, if any, the remedy
sought, and the hearing locale requested." AAA Rule 5; see Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Robert & Barchman, 916 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. IML 1996)
(holding that arbitrators, not the courts, determine claim specificity under NYSE
Rule 612(a)); David E. Robbins, Securities Arbitration from the Arbitrators' Perspec-
tive, 23 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 171, 171-72 (1990), stating:
Most arbitrators just glance at the statement of claim after being ap-
pointed, and, unless they are chairmen and have to rule on pre-hearing
discovery issues, arbitrators only read the pleadings carefully shortly
before the first hearing[,1 [that] [clomplaint-like drafting rarely elicits an
emotional response from arbitrators .... [and that] [fin the claim, arbi-
trators do not like reading every possible cause of action.
51 See Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 87,463 (referring to concerns that
"NASD arbitration has become too litigious [along with] the proliferation of discov-
ery requests and disputes").
£2 See UCA, supra note 10, § 20(a)-(c); NASD Rule 32(a)-(c), supra note 10.
See sources cited supra note 52. Generally, 'discovery disputes are resolved
either on written submission to the arbitrators or at the pre-hearing conference,
which is conducted by one or more of the arbitrators selected for the case." Ruder
Report, supra note 11, at 87,464.
" For example, depositions are rarely allowed and motion practice is not as
complex. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, as the NASD
Task Force observed, "[plarties frequently abuse the present NASD discovery
rules.&" Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 87,464; see Seligman, supra note 43, at
351 (pointing out that lack of guidance, inconsistency and abuse in the arbitration
discovery process should prompt corrective action).
" Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 87,463 ('Although the [Arbitration] Code
does not set forth criteria for deciding requests for depositions, the Arbitrator's
Manual suggests that depositions should be permitted only under fairly narrow
circumstances."); SICA, ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 10 (1992), stating:
Access to depositions should be granted to preserve the testimony of ill
or dying witnesses, or of persons who are unable or unwilling to travel
long distances for a hearing and may not otherwise be required to attend
the hearing, as well as to expedite large or complex cases, and in other
situations as deemed appropriate by the arbitrtor ....
Note, however, the view of one authoritative source:
It has generally been recognized ... that the absence of deposition usu-
ally works to the advantage of brokerage firm respondents who have
most of the information necessary to prove a claim in their possession
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dispositive motions prior to the formal hearing are not encour-
aged.5
6
At the formal hearing, the panel is comprised of a majority
of "public" arbitrators.57 Unlike a judicial proceeding, formal
rules of evidence do not apply,58 thereby allowing the intro-
duction of "hearsay."9 Relevance and materiality are key cri-
teria in the arbitrators' determination relating to the admissi-
bility and weight given to evidence proffered.0
Arbitrators, not being bound by precise legal standards in
their decisions,61 may render awards premised on applicable
(often in a form that is not comprehensible to the ordinary claimant or
his counsel) and who do not have to bear the burden of proof in estab-
lishing a claim.
Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Industry Arbitrations: An Ex-
amination and Analysis, 53 ALB. L. REV. 755, 811 (1989).
"6 See CANE & SHUB, supra note 4, at 114 (stating that generally there is no
opportunity "to raise a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action or a
motion for summary judgment in arbitration"). Nonetheless, several pre-hearing
motions are permitted, including:
(1) a request for more definite statement of claim; (2) motion to consoli-
date; (3) motion to sever; (4) motion for lack of timeliness; (5) motion to
decline jurisdiction; (6) motion to bar certain facts or defenses when a
respondent only pleads a general denial or when it fails to answer; and
(7) motion to bar certain facts or defenses when not raised in the an-
swer.
Robbins, supra note 50, at 175 (citing SICA, ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 55,
at 2). Note, moreover, that with respect to particular legal issues, the Arbitrator's
Manual allows "the submission of briefs in reference to a particular legal issue
setting forth a law or statute and how it applies to the facts of the case." CANE &
SHUB, supra note 4, at 115 (citing SICA, ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 55, at
6); see FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 302-08; David E. Robbins & Michael H. Stone,
Discovery Panel, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the
Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1551 (1995).
5 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
5, See UCA, supra note 10, § 21; SHELDON M. JAFFEE, BROKER-DEALERS AND
SECURITIES MARKETS: A GUIDE TO THE REGULATORY PROCESS 19 (1977) (stating
that arbitrators "do not rigidly adhere to the rules of evidence and allow the intro-
duction of documentary and other evidence, if, in a general sense, it appears reli-
able").
"9 See CANE & SHUB, supra note 4, at 37 (stating that "arbitrators routinely
consider hearsay and other testimony not admissible in a court of law and give it
whatever weight they feel it deserves under the circumstances").
60 See UCA, supra note 10, § 21; ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS,
SECURITIES FRAUD AND CoMMODMM IES FRAUD § 16.01-16.05 (1994 & Supp.); sources
cited supra notes 58-59.
61 See SICA, ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 55, at i (stating that arbitra-
tors "keep equity in view"); Jaffee, supra note 58, at 338 (stating that "arbitrators
are not bound to precise legal standards in their decisions"); Lowenfels &
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self-regulatory organization ("SRO") standards, industry cus-
tom, or even concepts of equity and fairness.' Indeed, damag-
es may be awarded to claimants for violations of SRO rules
where no monetary remedy is provided for such misconduct
under federal or state securities law.' Moreover, many arbi-
trators are not attorneys and, even for those who are lawyers,
they may not have expertise in securities law.'
No written decision is required by the arbitration rules;'
only the names of the parties, a summary of the issues pre-
sented, the relief sought and awarded, a statement of other
Bromberg, supra note 55, at 784 (stating that "arbitration panels are not bound by
precise legal standards in their decisionse); Margaret Pedrick Sullivan, The Scope
of Modern Arbitral Awards, 62 TuL L. REV. 1113 (1988) (stating that arbitrators
are not strictly required to apply substantive law).
' See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 55, at 784; see also sources cited
supra notes 60-61. Such claims normally assert state common law grounds for
relief
' See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 55, at 784-88; Poser, supra note 15,
at 1108-10. Examples include claims relating to unsuitability, unauthorized trading,
proper execution of customer orders, and margin deficiencies. Generally, these
claims are actionable under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act only if deception, materi-
ality, scienter and other elements are proven. As stated in Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Goldman, 593 F.2d 129, 134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 838 (1979), "the courts have typically found no private right of action exists
for violation of exchange or dealer rules in the absence of a finding of fraud."
Moreover, courts have held that no private right of action exists on behalf of in-
vestors for violation of the margin requirements. See, eg., Bennett v. United
States Trust Co. of New York, 770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1058 (1986). For further discussion, see MARC L STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 9.03 (1996).
See Ruder Report, supra note 11, at 87,468-87,479.
' See NASD Rule 41, supra note 10; see also Masucci, supra note 18, at 190-
91. Note, however, that for large and complex cases, upon a party's request, a
written decision must be provided that will be made public. Upon refusal by the
arbitrators to produce written findings of fact and conclusions of law, such arbitra-
tors will be replaced. See Rules Changed to Mae Written Findings Easier to Ob-
tain in Larger Arbitrations, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 816 (1990). Cases that
qualify for large and complex status are determined on a case by case basis. Such
cases may include "class actions, cases involving multiple parties, cases dealing
with a novel legal theory, and disputes involving potentially large sums of money."
Lynn Katzler, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Required in All Securities
Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the Securities Industry, 45
Am. U. L. REv. 151, 167 (1995) (relying on Ruder Urges Rules to Allow Arbitrators
to Refer Complex Cases to Court System, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1087
(1988)); see Arbitration Reforms Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Ses3. 99-
100 (1988) (statement of Theodore Krebsbach) (stating that the vast majority of
arbitrations are typical broker-customer disputes).
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issues resolved (e.g., jurisdictional rulings), the names of the
arbitrators, and the signatures of the arbitrators who concur in
the award are necessary.6
The rationale frequently provided for not requiring written
opinions is that mandating such opinions would contravene the
policies underlying arbitration, which are to provide an expedi-
tious, efficient, and informal forum of alternative dispute reso-
lution.67 Another argument advanced is that requiring written
opinions would be time consuming and burdensome, thereby
deterring many qualified individuals from agreeing to serve as
arbitrators. 8 Nonetheless, there may well be another key rea-
son why arbitrators avoid writing opinions: Because the panel's
decision can be overturned by a federal court only on narrow
grounds, such as bias, misconduct, or manifest disregard of the
law, 9 the writing of an opinion draws a "road map" by which
See, e.g., NASD ARBITRATION CODE, supra note 10, at Rule 41.
' See, e.g., Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d
1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1990); Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882
F.2d 529, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028 (1990); Sobel v. Hertz,
Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Jacob-
son, 126 F.R.D. 24, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
' See Katzler, supra note 65, at 164 n.92 (asserting that requiring written
opinions "could very well hinder, rather than enhance, the administration of arbi-
tration proceedings in that it would be time consuming and burdensome and thus
may discourage many qualified individuals from serving as an arbitrator") (citing
Securities Arbitration Group Opposes Mandatory Written Opinions in All Cases, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1952, 1953 (1987)).
"a Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994), al-
lows for vacating an arbitral award based only on:
1. [Ihe award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
2. [Elvident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or either of them;
3. [Tlhe arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
4. [T]he arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the matter submitted
was not made.
Although error of law is not provided as a basis for vacating an award pursuant
to § 10, several courts have embraced a standard focusing on "manifest disregard
of the law" by the arbitrators as a ground for vacating an award. See CANE &
SHUB, supra note 4, at 326-39 (citing cases). Nonetheless, the burden to show
"manifest disregard" is a high one for aggrieved parties. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995); Advest,
Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1986). Succinctly stat-
ed, "[cihallenging an arbitration award is usually fruitless." Lowenfels & Bromberg,
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a disgruntled party will have greater likelihood of upsetting
the arbitral award. Moreover, being pressed for time, inade-
quately paid, and not accomplished in authoring written opin-
ions (particularly in a complex area like securities law), any
written decision incurs the risk as being viewed with disfavor
by a learned federal court. Because arbitrators perceive that
they act in good faith, follow the spirit if not the letter of the
applicable law, and seek to do justice, they thus are reluctant
to explain their rationale in a written opinion. The end product
is one that reaches a defined result with no reasoning provided
to support such result and with the losing party having little
likelihood of overturning such result."0
VI. FEDERAL LAW: To THE LIKING OF THE INDUSTRY
In the era prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
McMahon, disgruntled brokerage firm customers eagerly
sought protection in the federal courts." The principal provi-
sion invoked was section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Due to the
fact that the Exchange Act (unlike the Securities Act72) pro-
supra note 55, at 864. Or, as stated by Professor Fletcher, "it is nearly impo3sible
to argue successfully that an arbitration panel was guilty of manifest disregard of
the law." FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 389. On occasion, however, courts have va-
cated arbitration awards, even under the "manifest disregard of the law" standard.
See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Skrunick, 909 F.2d 456 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 915 (1993); see also FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 11(a) ("evident material miscalculation of
figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or
property referred to in the award basis for modifying or correcting arbitral
award"); see generally David A. Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base
Decisions, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1988).
" See Jaffee, supra note 58, at 339 (stating that "(wihere the facts are in
dispute, testimony contradictory, and blame not entirely one-sided, arbitration
forums have been known to compromise verdicts [and that] [sluch verdicts...
often represent a sense of justice which fits the facts of the case"); authorities
cited supra notes 64-69; see also McIlroy v. Paine Webber, Inc., 11993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 97,659 (5th Cir. 1993) (arbitral award of
$40,000 where more than $1 million sought not "evident material miscalculation"
under FAA § 11(a), therefore denying investors request that court modify award).
71 See Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule
10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980). Note that, even
prior to McMahon, investor-customers had the option of arbitrating rather than
seeking relief in the courts. See, e.g., NASD ARBiTRATION CODE, supra note 10,
Rule 12(a) ; NYSE Constitution art. I1; NYSE Rule 600(a), supra note 10 (all
providing that any subject claim may be arbitrated upon the customer's demand).
72 Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1994).
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vides for exclusive federal jurisdiction, these actions were insti-
tuted in federal court.7 3 Moreover, key Securities Act provi-
sions asserted in this context included sections 12"4 and
17(a).75 In addition, secondary liability doctrines seeking to
hold brokerage firms and supervisory personnel liable encom-
passed aiding and abetting,76 controlling person, 77 and re-
78spondeat superior.
Beginning with the mid 1970s and continuing to the pres-
ent, investors generally have fared progressively worse under
federal law. 7' This observation, particularly when compared to
the expansionist decisions of the 1960s and early 1970s,"°
7' Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
74 15 U.S.C. § 771 (Supp. 1995); see, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739
F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1012 (1985).
71 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). Prior to the late 1970s, several courts recognized an
implied private right of action for damages under § 17(a). See, e.g., Newman v.
Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099
(9th Cir. 1988); Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After
Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163, 172-82 (1979).
7 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
' Section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o; § 20(a) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); see, e.g., Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981).
78 See, e.g., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Wood Walker & Co. v. Marbury Management, Inc., 449 U.S.
1011 (1980); see generally Ralph C. Ferrara & Diane Sanger, Derivative Liability
in Securities Law: Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding
and Abetting, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007 (1983). But see infra notes 118-127
and accompanying text.
7' See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 359-61 (1991) (adopting statute of limitations of one year after discovery and
no longer than three years after the violation for § 10(b) actions); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that absent a duty to disclose
based on a fiduciary or similar relationship, silence does not give rise to liability);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring that scienter be
shown in § 10(b) private actions); see generally Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Su-
preme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings,
65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977). But see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (ap-
proving use of fraud-on-the-market theory for purposes of establishing presumption
of reliance in § 10(b) actions).
" See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6,
13 n.9 (1971) (implied private cause of action for damages exists under § 10(b) of
Exchange Act and rule 10b-5); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460-61
(1969) (recognizing SEC's authority to regulate securities activities of insurance
companies); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (implied private right
of action under § 14(a) of Exchange Act); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 197 (1963) (requiring under Investment Advisers Act of 1940
that registered investment adviser disclose personal financial interest in securities
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may well signify that uninitiated investors would prefer arbi-
tration today, even if they could elect to proceed in federal
court. The following discussion, highlighting restrictions that
investors today face in federal court, emphasizes this point.
A. Pleading Requirements
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that fraud
"be stated with particularity."8' In construing whether com-
plaints alleging securities fraud pass muster under Rule 9(b),
the Second Circuit mandates that specific facts be set forth
supporting a "strong inference of fraud."' This standard, for
example, was applied in Wexner v. First Manhattan Co.'
There, Susan Wexner (a relative of The Limited, Inc. founder
Les Wexner) brought suit under section 10(b) against the bro-
kerage firm. She alleged that the firm had perpetrated decep-
tion in the sale of her Limited stock, resulting in damages of
several million dollars. Although she detailed the alleged
scheme and underlying motive and was not entitled to discov-
ery at the pleading stage, the Second Circuit upheld the dis-
missal of her complaint for failing to satisfy Rule 9(b).'
The Second Circuit's strict pleading requirement generally
has been codified by Congress in the PSLRAP Y Hence, facts
recommended to clients).
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) provides: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the cir-
cumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred gener-
ally."
I See, e.g., Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990)
("Where pleading is permitted on information and belief, a complaint must adduce
specific facts supporting a strong inference of fraud or it will not satisfy even a
relaxed pleading standard."); accord, In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d
259 (2d Cir. 1993).
902 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1990).
s Id. at 172-73 (holding that Wexner's allegations were "conclusory and "un-
supported"); see Oppenheimer v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 94 F.3d 189 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding investor's complaint failed to allege fraud with adequate particularity). For
a more relaxed interpretation of Rule 9(b) prior to PSLRA, see, e.g., Shapiro v.
UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992); see generally Richard G. Himelrock,
Pleading Securities Fraud, 43 MD. L. REV. 342 (1984); William M. Richmond et
al., The Pleading of Fraud. Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959
(1987); Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with Particularity Under Rule 9(b),
97 HARv. L. REV. 1432 (1984).
8s Exchange Act § 21D(b) (quoted supra note 49); see Joint Explanatory State-
ment, supra note 49 (stating that standard adopted in PSLRA is stronger than
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giving rise to a strong inference of fraud must be alleged with
particularity in section 10(b) litigation.86 Moreover, no discov-
ery during the pleading stage generally is allowed under the
PSLRA,s7 and sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are more likely to be assessed against losing
parties (and their attorneys).'
B. Limitations on the Shingle Theory
Traditionally, the federal courts have recognized the appli-
cability of the "shingle" theory.8" The theory posits that by
"hanging out its shingle," a broker-dealer impliedly represents
that its conduct and the behavior of its employees will be fair
and will comport with professional norms. ° As the Second
Second Circuit test).
" Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2) (quoted supra note 49).
87 See Securities Act § 21(c); Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2)(B). Hence, the Litigation
Reform Act amends the 1933 and 1934 Acts to provide for (i) a stay of discovery
during the pendency of any motion to dismiss unless the court finds that particu-
larized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice
to a party, and (ii) the preservation of the evidence that is relevant to the allega-
tions of the complaint during the pendency of any stay or discovery. A party ag-
grieved by the willful failure of an opposing party to comply with the provisions
requiring preservation of evidence may seek appropriate sanctions. Litigation Re-
form Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. at 747 (Dec. 12, 1995). These provisions
will undoubtedly eliminate some of the burden of expenses incurred by defendants
who succeed in having the complaint in question dismissed.
" See Securities Act § 27(c); Exchange Act § 21D(c). The PSLRA amends the
1933 and 1934 Acts to mandate court review, upon final adjudication of private
securities actions thereunder, of the parties' or their attorneys' compliance with
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requirements for a good faith
factual and legal basis as to any pleading or dispositive motion. Securities Act §
27(c); Exchange Act § 21D(c). If the court finds that there is a "substantial failure"
of the parties or attorneys to comply with these provisions, the court is directed to
impose mandatory sanctions in accordance with Rule 11. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. at 747 (Dec. 12, 1995). The provisions set forth a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the award being the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a
direct result of the violation. This presumption may be rebutted by the sanctioned
party or attorney only upon proof that (i) the award will present an unreasonable
burden, or (ii) the violation was de minimis. See generally John W. Avery, Securi-
ties Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335 (1996).
" See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); see generally
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 60, § 5.7; ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION
AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5, § 210.03 (1992); Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud
and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (1983).
90 See authorities cited supra note 89.
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Circuit stated in Hanly v. SEC,9 "[a] securities dealer occu-
pies a special relationship to a buyer of securities in that by
his position he impliedly represents he has an adequate basis
for the opinions he renders." 2 One aspect of this duty, labeled
the suitability theory, recognizes an implied representation by
the broker that it will recommend only those securities suit-
able for each customer's investment objectives and economic
status.9
3
A number of other implied representations have been
recognized as coming within the shingle theory, including:
(1) an implied representation of fair pricing, including any markup
or markdown;
(2) an implied representation that the broker-dealer will execute
only authorized transactions for its customers;
(3) an implied representation to disclose any special consideration
that influences the broker-dealer's recommendation;
(4) an implied representation to execute promptly customers' orders;
and
(5) an implied representation that any recommendation made by a
broker-dealer to a customer has a reasonable basis.?
One may inquire, however, whether aspects of the shingle
theory still provide the basis for a section 10(b) right of action
in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green that deception or manipulation must be shown.'
A number of courts have taken the position that certain com-
ponents of the shingle theory no longer are viable.'5 For ex-
ample, in Pross v. Baird, Patrick & Co., Inc.,' a section 10(b)
claim based on unauthorized trading by a broker was dis-
91 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
"Id. at 596 (citations omitted).
9See NORfAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION: PRIVATE
RIGHTS OF AcTiON (1995); Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look at
Economic Theory and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. LJ. 805 (1985); F.
Harris Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Euoluing Federal Fidu-
ciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 435 (1977); Denis T. Rice, Rec-
ommendations by a Broker-Dealer: The Requirement for a Reasonable Basis, 25
MERCER L. REV. 537 (1974); Arvid E. Roach II, The Suitability Obligations of
Brokers: Present Law and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 29 HASTINGS LJ.
1067 (1978).
9MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL
AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 2:17 (1985 & Supp. 1996).
Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
" See Langevoort, supra note 89.
585 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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missed. The court reasoned that the claim was in actuality one
for breach of fiduciary duty not involving the element of decep-
tion necessary to invoke section 10(b).9"
Moreover, courts allow brokers to engage in certain
nonactionable puffery. Such statements as "[tihis deal will
make you rich" and "I'm the best broker in Kansas City" are
not actionable due to lack of materiality and lack of justifiable
reliance.9 On the other hand, where specific and realistic per-
centages are communicated to the investor, such as "your re-
turn will be 15 percent annually," many courts will find such a
statement to constitute actionable misrepresentation.'
C. Non-Actionability of Certain Oral Communications
In the brokerage setting, it is not uncommon for a broker
to make optimistic statements concerning a recommended
security to one's client. Such oral communications may be con-
veyed in situations where the written materials adequately set
forth the risks associated with the investment. Under such
circumstances, is the broker subject to liability for the alleged-
ly false oral statements? When analyzing this question, the
federal courts have focused on section 10(b)'s reliance ard
materiality components.1 ' In most jurisdictions, the fact that
the written disclosure documents are accurate is not disposi-
tive. 10
2
" Id. at 1460-61.
See, e.g., Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1984); Newman v.
Rothschild, 651 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec.
Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
" See, e.g., Cohen v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 713 F. Supp. 653, 658
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Newman v. Rothschild, 662 F. Supp. 957, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
o See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1993);
Myers v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991); Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco,
Inc., 844 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1988).
102 Thus, most courts apply the following factors in this context:
(1) the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and secu-
rities matters; (2) the existence of long standing business or personal
relationships; (3) access to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a
fiduciary relationship; (5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to
detect the fraud; (7) whether the plaintiff initiated the stock transaction
or sought to expedite the transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity
of the misrepresentations.
Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); accord, Myers v.
Finkle, 950 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991); Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529
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Nonetheless, in the Second Circuit, when the written docu-
ments are accurate, the broker's allegedly false oral statements
generally will not be actionable, with the proviso that the exis-
tence of a fiduciary relationship between the broker and the
customer may dictate otherwise."°3 This is the case even
when the customer is known by the broker to be unsophisticat-
ed.'O' Moreover, the Seventh Circuit adheres to an even more
restrictive approach premised on a "materiality"' analysis.
Under that court's interpretation, the written word trumps the
oral, thereby mandating that a broker's verbal lies that contra-
dict an accurate disclosure document are deemed inactionable
as a matter of law.'
D. Statute of Limitations
Under section 13 of the Securities Act, 7 the statute of
limitation for section 11"' and 12(a)(2) 9 claims is one year
after constructive knowledge of the facts constituting the viola-
tion and in no event more than three years after the transac-
tion." In Lampf," the Supreme Court construed section
(11th Cir. 1989); Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir.
1987). But see Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317, 1325 (7th Cir.
1988) (stating that "written words govern oral ones in order to reward truthful
disclosures and facilitate accurate assessment of risk).
103 See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031-33 (2d Cir. 1993)
(noting that 'none of the Limited Partners allege the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship or of a longstanding business or personal relationship with Hutton or its
brokers").
104 Id. ("presum[ing] that the Limited Partners are unsophisticated investors").
"o See, e.g., Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1131-32 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1073 (1994); Acme Propane, 844 F.2d at 1325.
" Acme Propane, 844 F.2d at 1325. A somewhat related doctrine is the "be-
speaks caution" doctrine which provides that "where an offering statement, such as
a prospectus, accompanies statements of future forecasts, projections and expecta-
tions with adequate cautionary language, those statements are not actionable as
securities fraud." In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 549
(D.N.J. 1992), affd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1178 (1994);
see In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 185 (1995); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (6th Cir. 1994); Mayer v.
Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993); Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that
"Bespeak Caution," 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994).
107 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994).
103 Id. § 77k.
10 Id. § 771(a)(2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. at 747 (1995).
Prior to the PSLRA, § 12(a)(2) was § 12(2).
"1 15 U.S.C. § 77k (setting forth that suit must be brought within one year
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10(b) to have a similar statute of limitations."2 In Lampf, the
Court departed from lower court precedent that section 10(b)
claims were subject to equitable tolling."'
Accordingly, section 10(b) claims have, at most, a limita-
tions period of three years."' Significantly, however, the stat-
ute, as construed by the lower courts, also has a one-year in-
quiry notice period.' Thus, this one-year period commences
after the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the
facts constituting the violation.1 6 In construing this one-year
period, courts have applied the mythical "reasonable person"
standard, refusing to consider the plaintiffs actual knowledge
or lack of investment acumen. In the Second Circuit, this ap-
proach is exemplified by Dodds v. Cigna Securities, Inc., where
a widow with a tenth-grade education and four dependent chil-
dren was denied her day in court because the one-year inquiry
notice period was held to have elapsed."'
E. Secondary Liability Theories
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,"' aiding and abet-
ting liability under section 10(b) was overwhelmingly recog-
after the facts constituting the violation were known or should have been known
to the plaintiff and in no event more than three years after the alleged violation).
. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
1 Id. at 359-64.
1 See James W. Beardsely, Jr., Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 BUS.
LAW. 645 (1986); Gordon W. Stewart, Statutes of Limitation for Rule 10b-5, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1021 (1982).
11. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364.
... Some authorities suggest that this one-year period should commence upon
actual notice, not inquiry notice. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg,
SEC Rule 10b-5 and Its New Statute of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Su-
preme Court, 51 BUS. LAW. 309 (1996); Steinberg, supra note 63, § 7.09121. None-
theless, cases subsequent to Lampf have applied the one-year inquiry notice stan-
dard. See infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
. See, e.g., Tregenza v. Great Am. Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1837 (1994); Dodds v. Cigna Sec. Inc., 12 F.3d 346
(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1401 (1994); Kaplan v. Kahn, [1995 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 98,623 (N.D. Cal. 1995); cases cited in
Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 115, at 314-25.
17 Dodds v. Cigna Sec. Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 349-53 (2d Cir. 1993).
"8 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
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nized by the lower federal courts." In addition, the doctrine
of respondeat superior liability was invoked by the vast majori-
ty of federal courts to hold broker-dealers vicariously liable for
their agents' securities law misconduct."'
In Central Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court, utilizing a
strict linguistic interpretation, held that aiding and abetting
liability may not be imposed in private actions under section
10(b)."' The high Court's holding precludes aiding and abet-
ting liability in private actions under other securities law pro-
visions that do not expressly provide for such liability.' In
addition, the tenor of the Court's language in Central Bank'
signifies to many, including Justice Stevens in his dissent,"
that vicarious liability premised on principles of conspiracy and
respondeat superior no longer survives.' While this percep-
tion has come to fruition with respect to conspiracy claims,"
the continued viability of the doctrine of respondeat superior
has not yet been resolved.m
" See id. at 192-93 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
r' See, eg., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-78 (9th Cir.
1990) (en banc) (citing cases), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991).
12 511 U.S. at 170-92. The Court's language may well have signified that its
rationale extended to SEC enforcement actions. See Steinberg, supra note 21, at
497-98. In 1995, however, Congress gave the SEC express authority to pursue
aiders and abettors for 1934 Act violations. See Exchange Act § 20(f, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7St(f) (1994).
See STEINBERG, supra note 63, § 10.02 n.5.
"' 511 U.S. at 173-78.
Id. at 200 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that lower court decisions
recognizing theories of conspiracy and respondeat superior "appear unlikely to
survive the Court's decision").
125 Id. at 173-78.
' Hence, after Central Bank of Denver, the vast majority of lower courts have
rejected the propriety of conspiracy claims in private securities litigation. See, eg.,
Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No. 82 C 4762, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3352 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1995); In re Faleck & Margolies, Ltd., Civ. Nos. 89-8548
& 90-1356, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 970 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1995); In re Medimmune
Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F. Supp. 953 (D. Md. 1995).
' See, e.g., Pollack v. Laidlow Holdings, Inc., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 9 98,741, 92,509 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that lunlike aiding
and abetting liability, ... liability of a principal based upon apparent authority
has long been recognized by federal courts"). But see Central Bank of Denuer, 511
U.S. at 200 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also American Telephone and Tele-
graph v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1430-31 (3d Cir.
1994) (construing applicability of doctrine of respondeat superior under Lanham
Act), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995); see generally Richard A. Booth, Vicarious
Liability and Securities Fraud, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 347 (1995); Alan R. Bromberg,
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F. Section 12(a)(2) Claims
Section 12(2) (now 12(a)(2))121 provides a potentially at-
tractive remedy. Contrary to section 10(b), section 12(a)(2) does
not require a plaintiff to prove reliance or loss causation. 121
Moreover, unlike section 10(b), which mandates that the plain-
tiff establish the defendant's scienter,"3 ° section 12(a)(2) im-
poses liability for actionable disclosure deficiencies unless such
defendant affirmatively shows that he or she acted with rea-
sonable care.'
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co.,132 the lower federal courts were unanimous in
their view that section 12(a)(2) applied to initial private and
public offerings... and were divided as to whether the statute
extended to secondary market transactions.'34 In Gustafson,
to the surprise of many,'35 the Supreme Court held that the
term "prospectus" in section 12(a)(2) is limited to that used in
a "public" offering 3 ' and that the term "oral communication"
in the statute is confined to those communications which relate
Aiding and Abetting: Sudden Death and Possible Resurrection, 24 REV. SEC. &
COMM. REG. 133 (1994); Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus.
LAW. 1429 (1994).
'2 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. 1995).
1" See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir.
1980). Section 12(b) contains an affirmative defense, allowing the defendant to
show that the disclosure deficiency did not cause the loss (in whole or in part). 15
U.S.C. § 771(b).
130 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
131 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2); see generally Therese H. Maynard, The Affirmative
Defense of Reasonable Care Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1993).
132 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
133 See generally Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105
HARV. L. REV. 908 (1992).
13, Compare Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.)
(limiting § 12(2) to initial offerings), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 820 (1991), with Pacific
Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993) (extending
§ 12(2) to secondary transactions), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1160 (1994).
13' See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Liability Does Not Extend to Private Offerings or
Secondary Trading, 17 SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. Nos. 14, 15 (AprjlMay 1995).
13 115 S. Ct. at 1073-74 (construing the term "prospectus" as a "term of art
referring to a document that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer
or controlling shareholder").
1526 [Vol. 62: 1503
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
to such prospectus.'37 Hence, section 12(a)(2ys scope is now
confined to public offerings by issuers or their controlling
shareholders." 8
The Court's holding greatly reduces the applicability of
section 12(a)(2) in the brokerage firm setting. No longer may
the statute be invoked by investors against brokerage firms
(and their agents) in the initial private offering context or in
secondary trading transactions. Hence, financial intermediaries
today are not subject to section 12(a)(2) liability exposure for
misstatements made in a Rule 506 Regulation D1  offering
memorandum or for oral misrepresentations made by their
agents in connection with such offering.4 The same holds
true for recommendations made with inadequate disclosure in
a brokerage firm's newsletters concerning outstanding securi-
ties, as well as an agent's verbal misrepresentations made to a
client in connection with the sale of outstanding securities."'
G. Section 17(a)
Prior to about 1980, Securities Act section 17(a) was per-
ceived by some authorities as an attractive remedy for plain-
tiffs. 42 If construed broadly, the statute extended to offerees
(even if they were not purchasers), applied to the secondary
13 Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1066-67, 1072-74. Hence, after Gustafson, § 12(a)(2) applies to regis-
tered offerings and to offerings that are public in nature (such as pursuant to
SEC Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 et seq.) that othervise would mandate
registration but for the availability of an exemption under § 3 of the Securities
Act.
1 Rule 506 is a safe harbor to the Securities Act § 4(2) private placement
exemption from registration, and, hence, offerings conducted in accordance with
Rule 506 are private. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1996); Mark A. Sargent, The New
Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 225 (1990).
" See, e.g., ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp., 899 F. Supp.
1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
141 See cases cited supra note 140; Ted J. Fiflis, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co, Judi-
cial vs. Legislative Power, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 423 (1996); Therese Maynard, The
Impact of Gustafson and Its Methodology, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 61 (1996); Richard A.
Booth, The Scope of Section 12(2) After Gustafson, INSIGHTS, July 1995, at 8.
14 See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Im-
plied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641
(1978).
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trading markets, and imposed liability for negligence.' To-
day, by contrast, section 17(a) serves solely as a government
enforcement resource.' 4 This consequence is due to the lower
courts overwhelmingly holding that no private right of action
exists under section 17(a).4 5
H. Construing State Securities Claims
Although not without exception,14 a number of federal
courts have construed applicable state securities laws consis-
tent with and no broader than their perceived federal counter-
parts.'4 7 The result is the dismissal of the state as well as the
federal securities claims. One may question whether state
courts would join in this interpretation. 4 1
I. Summation
The foregoing discussion illustrates that brokerage firm
customers today are rarely in a worse position in arbitration
than they would be in a federal court. In the last two decades,
the federal courts have construed the securities statutes and
pleading rules in a restrictive fashion. In conjunction there-
1 See Steinberg, supra note 75, at 175-86 (discussing issues and citing authori-
ties).
1. Today, the SEC frequently elects to institute enforcement actions alleging §
17(a) violations in addition to or in lieu of § 10(b) violations. See STEINBERG &
FERRARA, supra note 94, § 2:05; WILLIAM KS. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSID-
ER TRADING § 10.4 (1996); see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
1 See, e.g., Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Washing-
ton Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987); Landry v.
All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982); STEINBERG, supra note 63,
§ 6.03(2), at n.57 (collecting cases).
14 See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 532 (5th Cir. 1992) (inter-
preting Texas Securities Act broader than federal law); Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1048-51 (11th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Florida com-
mon law broader than U.S. or Florida securities law).
17 See, e.g., Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Group, 919 F.2d 1014, 1032 (5th Cir.
1990) (interpreting Texas securities law); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104,
1130-31 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989) (interpret-
ing Louisiana securities law), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989); Capri v. Murphy,
856 F.2d 473, 479 (2d Cir. 1988) (interpreting Connecticut securities law).
"' See Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny
Skies for Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 395, 427-28 (1993).
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with, a number of federal courts have registered their disdain
for perceived strike suit litigation." 9 And, as a more recent
example, enactment of the PSLRA imposes still greater bur-
dens on plaintiffs.' Thus, today investors are likely to fare
better in the arbitral forum.
VII. THE STATE COURTS--DEPENDS ON THE "STATE"
Whether investors would fare better in state court rather
than arbitration depends largely on the applicable state. For
example, New York may be viewed as a pro-securities industry
state, at least insofar as private actions are concerned. Indeed,
that state's securities act has been held by the New York high
court not to provide a private right of action for defrauded
purchasers or sellers.'' Although actions for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and fraud may be instituted in certain contexts,"2
recovery for punitive damages is severely curtailed."' Given
this perceived pro-industry position, plaintiffs may prefer to
arbitrate their claims.'5
"' See, eg., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975)
(stating that "[t]here has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule
10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that
which accompanies litigation in general"), rehg denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); DiLeo
v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir.) (affirming dismissal of complaint
based on "fraud by hindsight"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941 (1990).
" See supra notes 49, 85-88 and accompanying text.
... See CPC Inftl, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 274-75, 514 N.E.2d
116, 117-18, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (1987) (refusing to recognize private right of
action under New York's blue sky laws, despite the nearly unanimous recognition
by other states that private civil suits are available for violations of such laws).
" See, eg., Independent Order of Forresters v. Donaldson, Luflkin & Jenrette,
Inc., 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (under New York law,
dismissing claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation but allowing
claim for express breach of warranty to proceed); see also Davis v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1214-17 (8th Cir. 1990) (observing
that whether fiduciary relationship exists is matter of state law and holding that
nondiscretionary securities accounts may give rise to fiduciary relationship under
South Dakota law).
"' See, e-g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976) (holding that under New York law punitive damages cannot
be awarded in arbitrations); Franklin D. Ormsten, Garrity and Mastrobuono: A
Continuing Tale of Two Cases, N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 32.
"I See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995)
(holding that in spite of New York choice of law provision in arbitration agree-
ment at bar punitive damages nonetheless may be awarded). For further discus-
sion, see supra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
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A number of other states, however, provide for more mean-
ingful redress for investors. Many state securities statutes
provide for recovery based on a brokerage firm's negligence in
both the primary and secondary trading markets,'55 dispense
with the reliance and loss causation requirements,1 ' provide
for collateral participant liability,57 and contain longer stat-
utes of limitations than their federal counterparts.'58 In addi-
tion, the doctrine of respondeat superior has been applied by
state courts in the brokerage firm setting.159 Moreover,
attorneys' fees and punitive damages may be awarded.6 '
The procedural rules in state courts also are more favor-
able. The rigorous federal pleading fraud with particularity
standards normally are not present in the state courts.'6'
Moreover, motions seeking dismissal are granted with less
frequency in state courts. Hence, juries appear to be the ulti-
.. See, e.g., Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 920 n.7 (6th Cir.
1991); Kittilson v. Ford, 608 P.2d 264, 265 (Wash. 1980); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bryne, 320 So. 2d 436, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
writ discharged, 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1976); Fakhrdai v. Mason, 696 P.2d 1164,
1166-67 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
" See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Rouseff, 537 So. 2d 978, 981 (Fla. 1989), dis-
cussed in Marilyn Cane, Proximate Causation in Securities Fraud Actions for Re-
scission, FLA. BAR Q. REP., Spring 1989, at 14. As stated by Professor Cane: "It
would seem that a plaintiff bringing a suit under [the Florida statute] could re-
scind [the transaction] without a showing of proximate cause, or any damages, or
any scienter on the part of the defendant." Cane, supra, at 14.
... See, e.g., UNIFORM SECURIrIES ACT § 410(a) (1956) (amended 1958); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Anderson
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F
(West 1994); 7B U.L.A. 643 (1985), reprinted in 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9q 5500,
at 156 (1985); see generally Douglas M.. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability
Under State Securities Laws, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1027 (1992); Long, supra note 151,
§ 7.08; Steinberg, supra note 21, at 512-14.
"' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (two years
after inquiry notice and no more than five years after the transaction-two
year/five year); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-41 (Michie 1978) (two year/five year);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-504(a) (West 1993) (one year/four year); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-33H(2), (3) (West 1994) (three year/five year).
... See Long, supra note 157, Blue Sky Law § 7.09 (citing cases).
'60 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2001 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.21(B) (Anderson 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(2) (1993); WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.430(1), (2) (West 1989).
"' See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.9 (2d ed. 1993);
supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
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mate decisionmaker more often in the state courts, thereby
exposing institutions, such as brokerage firms, to enhanced lia-
bility exposure."'
CONCLUSION
The final analysis is that investors today likely fare better
in arbitration than they would in federal court. Nonetheless, in
those states that provide a meaningful securities and common
law remedial framework on a timely basis, investors seeking
relief against brokerage firms and their agents likely would
favor the state court forum if they had the choice.
Brokerage firm clients normally fit comfortably within the
state securities framework. Such clients are purchasers of the
subject securities and therefore have standing to sue under the
applicable blue sky statute. Brokerage firms and their agents
frequently are "sellers" and therefore come within the express
terms of the statute. Even if not deemed a "seller," a brokerage
firm is subject to liability under the doctrines of control person
and respondeat superior. The firm's executives likewise have
liability exposure as control persons. Accordingly, material
misstatements and omissions, whether stated orally or in solic-
itation materials used in connection with investor purchases in
the primary and secondary markets, expose subject brokerage
firm defendants to liability unless they meet certain affirma-
tive defenses."6
Of course, arbitrators apply principles of equity" along
with applicable securities and common law. Nonetheless, it
appears that most plaintiffs and their counsel bringing suit in
a favorable state forum would prefer to have a jury decide
these issues rather than a panel of arbitrators.
Although the final word is yet to be said on this subject,
arbitration is not the catastrophe to investors that many be-
lieved after McMahon. Indeed, investors today should be
pleased that they can present their story before arbitrators
162 See STEINBERG, supra note 63, § 9.06; see generally Matt Moffett & Thomas
Petzinger, Jr., Pennzoil Wins $10.53 Billion in Suit Against Texaco; Verdict Is
Called Highest Civil Judgment in History, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1985, at 3.
16 See authorities cited supra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
'"See supra notes 61-63, 70 and accompanying text.
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rather than being relegated to federal courts restrictively con-
struing what may be viewed as a narrow federal securities law
remedial framework.
As I was provided Professor Therese Maynard's Commen-
tary to this Article for the first time at the page-proof stage a
few days ago, I offer only a few brief observations. As an initial
point, I assure Professor Maynard that, contrary to her state-
ment, she is not the only academic who came to this forum on
securities arbitration with no agenda."5
Second, and far more disconcerting (at least to me), Profes-
sor Maynard misinterprets key points of my Article. Indeed,
she reads "implicit" statements into the Article that are simply
not there.'66 I do not contend in this Article that arbitration
is a panacea for investors or that we can be assured that arbi-
trators will faithfully apply the "rule of law." 7 Indeed, I
have suggested otherwise. Looking at this subject from both a
practical and theoretical perspective, my fundamental premise
is that investors today may well prefer arbitrating their claims
in this setting rather than proceeding in the federal courts.
Third, Professor Maynard asserts that the presence of
arbitration in the investor-brokerage firm context creates the
possible erosion-if not the ultimate virtual extinction-of the
development of precedent (or the "rule of law") in this area. 1 8
She is partly correct. We must remember that the SEC re-
mains active in broker-dealer regulation (including investor-
brokerage firm conduct), resulting in key administrative and
judicial interpretations. Although the lack of a large number of
private court actions impedes the development of precedent,
the SEC's vigorous enforcement activities along with judicial
interpretations help assure that the "rule of law" will continue
to develop.
" Therese Maynard, McMahon: The Next Ten Years, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1533,
1533 (1996).
's See, e.g., id. at 1551, 1555.
' Id. at 1551-55.
'" Id. Professor Maynard does recognize that the SEC and SROs will engage in
enhanced rulemaking and other administrative functions in their efforts to further
refine the "rule of law." Id. at 1556.
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